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Emmanuel Yenshu Vubo
Management of Ethnic Diversity
in Cameroon against
the Backdrop of Social Crises1
The crisis of co-existence between erstwhile largely autonomous ethnic enti-
ties within the nation-state structure as it exists in the contemporary period
has become a central feature of the problematic of nation-building process
in Africa. The multiplicity of ethnic conflicts (both armed and unarmed),
the crisis of the tribalistic orientation of the state, tensions between com-
munities and the emergence of ethno-regional social movements are all
indicative of this crisis. These processes have been generated with unequal
speed within the territorial confines of the modern states to the extent that
the crisis of what one would call conviviality within the nation-state takes
different dimensions and proportions within the same territorial space. Our
aim in this work is to revisit the question of conviviality within the coastal
region of Cameroon and examine the strategies employed by the current
regime in Cameroon in coping with the crises posed by the coexistence of
peoples of different ethnic entities within this area.
This study takes as its point of departure events that characterised a
crisis of inter-ethnic relations in the late 1990s, starting with the aftermath
of the municipal elections of 1996 and extending into the first half of the
years 2000-2010. The events referred to here are the Sawa protests of 1996
and their consequences on the political evolution of Cameroon since then.
The method at hand is the sociology of everyday life. I combine my experi-
ences as a researcher living in the coastal areas of Cameroon since 1994
with newspaper reports and secondary data at the basis of previous and
parallel studies (Yenshu Vubo 1998, 2003; Konings & Nyamnjoh 2000;
Menthong 1996; Tatah Mentan 1996; Sindjoun 1996; Monga 2000). The
1. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the sub-regional conference
for the Central African region celebrating the 30th anniversary of the Council for
the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) held in Douala,
4-5 October 2003 on the theme Central Africa: Crisis and Reconstruction. We
are grateful to participants of Panel V for their comments, which we have found
useful to the development of this paper. I am also grateful to Victor Ngu Cheo
for useful comments.
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paper is therefore a continuation of an analysis initiated earlier on, the inten-
tion being to enrich and complement rather than taking a totally novel direc-
tion. My previous analysis was inscribed theoretically within the world
systems and historical sociology perspectives by arguing that the world time
of capitalism and its version of modernity are essential factors in the devel-
opment of structures of inequality or polarisation (Amin 1998), alienation
and certain forms of collective behaviour. The present analysis of the same
events gains inspiration from Morin’s assertion that “l’événement doit être
conçu au premier chef comme une information qui fait irruption aussi bien
dans le système social que le système mental du sociologue”/“the event has
to be considered primarily as a piece of information that makes a brutal
appearance both into the social system and the mental system of the sociolo-
gist” (Morin 1994: 210) (translation mine). Morin proposes two dimensions
to the study of social events: firstly, the process of modification and pro-
gressive disappearance set into motion by the event; secondly a generation
of other events and new processes by the synchronisation of otherwise latent
or independent/isolated dynamics. These give the meaning that is necessary
for the process of creativity that characterizes social movements. The area
under study has been described in a comprehensive manner and with illustra-
tions in Yenshu Vubo (2003: 595). We will start with a narrative of the
events that constitute the substance of the study. This will be followed by
an analysis of the social crises at the background for ethno regional claims.
A second step is an examination of the relationship between social crises
and ethnicity. This leads to an analysis of the relationship between local
identity politics and national political developments situating the former in
a context of global forces that seek to integrate them in a power game
beyond the scope of immediate claims.
The 1996 Elections and the “Spectre of Democracy”2
A brief chronology of some events of the Sawa Movement would help us
build the framework chronological of our topic. On the 10th of February
1996 three thousand indigenous inhabitants of Douala City3 (Duala, Bassa
and Bakoko), who are collectively known as Sawa, marched in protest of
the election of non-natives as mayors in “their city”. According to the organ-
isers of the protest march, they were dissatisfied with the fact that out of
five councils in which the Social Democratic Front (SDF) party won in the
municipal elections of January 21, 1996 only one of the mayors was an indig-
ene. The Sawa interpreted this as proof of Bamileke hegemonic intentions,
2. The same facts are related in YENSHU VUBO (1998) almost verbatim. The repeti-
tion is meant to refresh the minds of the reader with the events which we intend
to re-interpret. These events are equally reported by TATAH MENTAN (1996: 22).
3. The city of Douala currently members more than two million inhabitants.
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the Bamileke constituting the bulk of the SDF party membership and a demo-
graphic majority in Douala city. The protesters carried placards which read:
“Démocratie oui, hégémonie non” (“Democracy yes, Hegemony no”); “Pas
de démocratie sans protection des minorités et des autochtones” (“No to
democracy without the protection of minorities and indigenous peoples”);
“La majorité ethnique n’est pas l’expression de la démocratie mais de l’ex-
pansionnisme” (“Ethnic majority is not an expression of democracy but
rather that of expansionism”).
In an address to the protesters, the chief organiser of the march, Chief
Ekwalla Essaka Deido, one of the heads of the traditional corporate groups/
segments of the Duala4, declared that every Cameroonian who wanted to
become mayor had to go back and contest elections in his native council.
In an interview to the state-run daily newspaper, Cameroon Tribune, he
claimed that the Sawa had the exclusive right to become mayors in their
native land and went ahead to argue that although non-natives had bought
and occupied land from natives, the former could not claim such land as
their homeland. Other prominent Duala natives questioned the possibility
of non-natives (in this case Bamileke) becoming mayors in Douala when
even in Bamileke land natives of one town (e.g. Dschang) could not become
mayors in other towns (e.g. Bafoussam). They also questioned the land
Law of 1971 for making it possible for people to occupy land in an “anarchi-
cal” manner.
Sawa chiefs later petitioned the Head of State on the issue complaining
about certain ethnic groups that were bent on flouting the principle of peace-
ful coexistence between Cameroonians thus constituting a threat to national
unity. They claimed that they had been taken for granted and their hospital-
ity misconstrued by ethnic groups with hegemonic intentions. Native Dou-
ala city inhabitants were mobilised through indigenous associations such as
the Kod’a Mboa Sawa (the Sawa Household) and organised protest marches,
developments which the radical press interpreted as manipulations by gov-
ernment. The then governor of the South West Province, Oben Peter Ashu
was reported to explain the poor performance of the ruling Cameroon Peo-
ples’ Democratic Movement (CPDM) party in his province to the presence
of settlers i.e. immigrants5.
Later on, the elected Mayor of the Douala III Council, Mr. Souob Lazare,
a Bamileke, was expelled from the SDF party for failing to comply with the
party’s directives to appease the natives by placing a native as mayor of
that council. In view of these incidents, the SDF party decided to guarantee
a representation of local native interests in the municipal councils in which
it had scored a majority vote in these elections.
4. The use of this spelling seeks to distinguish the people from the town which
appears in the French spelling as Douala as one would find in the literature.
5. The Herald, February 19-21, 1996.
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In the same month, Presidential Decree No. 96/031 appointed indigenes
as government delegates (with supervisory and over-riding powers over
elected municipal councils and elected officials) in ten metropolitan areas
where the SDF won elections and their installation in towns considered Sawa
(Douala, Limbe, Kumba) was the occasion for the all Sawa to meet and
“congratulate the head of state” for heeding their call to put a check to the
hegemony of non-natives in “their cities”. This was interpreted by the rad-
ical press—controlled for the most part by Bamileke businessmen—as a
travesty of democracy since people who did not win the elections were
imposed on the council structures. Indeed the opposition SDF party has
continued to treat these appointments, a prerogative of government, as an
attempt to subvert the principles of democracy where the fortunes of the
party in power are waning especially as the appointees were all militants
of the ruling CPDM party which had lost elections in these areas. In fact
some of the appointees had run for the elections into the same councils
and lost.
On July 6, 1996, a banker of Bamileke origins and deputy co-ordinator
of the SDF party in the Littoral province was dismissed from the party for
anti-party activities. Poo’lah, a youth cultural organisation for the mobilisa-
tion of the Bamileke (organisation culturelle de la jeunesse pour la conscience
Bamileke), blamed the provincial co-ordinator of that party, a man of Sawa
origins, of being the brain behind his sacking. It went ahead to interpret
this act as falling within the framework of a plan hatched by Sawa chiefs and
elite to dispossess the Bamileke of their “vital space” (“espaces vitaux”). It
also reminded the mayor of the dominantly Bamileke nature of the party
and thus of the fact that he owed his position to the latter’s votes and
eventually ended up by calling on the party’s authorities to stop the anti-
Bamileke plot.
On July 10, 1996, fifteen Sawa Chiefs led by the most senior of them,
Prince René Bell, were reported to have gone round the prestigious quarter
of Bonapriso, a predominantly native Duala residential area, inspecting
houses belonging to non-natives. They were said to have entered the homes
of the latter ordering them to quit or renegotiate the value of the land on
which they had built. Again, Poo’lah considered this act as provocative
and indicated its readiness to react.
On March 8, 1997, chiefs from the South West and Littoral provinces
(Sawa) met in Kumba. During this meeting, the Prime Minister—of
Bakweri origins—declared that the incumbent President of the Republic as
well as the ruling CPDM party stood for the protection of minority rights and
the preservation of the rights of indigenous peoples. He therefore called on
them to vote for him in the next elections if they wanted their rights as
indigenous minorities to be protected.
This has brought to focus the question of the role of indigenous groups
in cosmopolitan areas in the conduct of affairs in what they consider their
homeland. This is principally an issue of the relation of a people to the
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land and a history. An ethnocentric press, developed with the indigene/
non-native question in focus, aids groups that raise such issues. On the
one hand is the Sawa press (Elimbi, Muendi, Fako International or Mendi
me Fako) and on the other Bamileke run press (Ouest Echo, Nde Echo)
which transpose the debate from the streets and neighbourhoods to the pub-
lic place. The Sawa press accused the press predominantly controlled by
the Bamileke of intellectual terrorism characteristic of Bamileke hegemony6
while the former read either governmental manipulations, political blackmail
or a crisis of identity in political terms to the extent that Elimbi’s columnist,
Eyoum, felt this was going to constitute the crux of political debates in the
country7. In several parts of coastal Cameroon, especially in the South
West Province, there has arisen a distinction in the popular imagination
between people considered indigenes (sons of the soil), “settlers”, on the
one hand, and others considered immigrants, non-natives or “come no go”
(Pidgin English expression for permanent immigrants). The then governor
of the latter province, Oben Peter Ashu, is reported to have requested that
residence permits be issued to immigrants from other areas before they
could vote during the legislative elections of May 17, 1997. Although no
such permits were issued many non-natives found themselves disenfranchi-
sed by discriminatory practices, which they consider were intended to favour
the party in power, if not crafted by apologists of the regime.
According to Ekambi8 (2003), the situation has crystallized into a face-
to-face animosity between the Duala and the Bamileke, who allegedly cons-
titute the dominant component of exogenous peoples in Douala city. He
explains this in purely irredentist terms, portraying the Duala as essentially
peaceful and welcoming peoples who are facing an assault from the essen-
tially invasive and aggressive Bamileke people who possess a high hege-
monic drive. A word of caution is necessary here. It would be wrong to
interpret the problem in such simplistic terms. Firstly there are other ethnic
groups of Cameroonian origins in the city of Douala with some of them
possessing greater cohesion and homogeneity than the so-called Bamileke.
This is the case of the Bassa and Beti who constitute some of the largest
single ethno-linguistic groups in Cameroon and who have some of the
highest concentrations in the city of Douala. If the Bassa have never been
in a situation of confrontation with the Duala, it is partly because of the
long history of their cohabitation—accommodation with the Duala in the
same space and partly as a result of their consequent integration in the
revived Ngondo annual celebrations and rituals as part of the newly invented
concept of Sawa people (Yenshu Vubo 2003: 610-611). The Beti, on their
part, have been integrated into the life of the city and are engaged in activi-
ties that do not challenge the natives. Secondly the term Bamileke is devoid
6. Elimbi, 26 June 1997.
7. Elimbi, No. 41, 26 June 1997.
8. Participant at the Conference at which this paper was presented.
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of any meaning either as a self-identity label or a concisely descriptive label
of acceptable usage largely because of its colonial and thus political ori-
gins. In fact this appellation has been adopted by certain persons (even
professional anthropologists) to refer to people of the Western highlands of
Cameroon or, what is called in some literature, Cameroon Grassfields (hence
the equally misleading label of “Grafi”) as the latter exhibit wide range of
cultural similarities although they do not express a common consciousness.
In the region referred to as Cameroon Grassfields, whose population has
been labelled Bamileke, there exist a multiplicity of once autonomous, self
assertive groups and independent looking peoples each with its own lan-
guage or dialect and variant of socio-political and socio-cultural institutions
as distinctive identity markers. Although this area of near cultural unity-
in-diversity stretches from Bum in the English speaking North West prov-
ince to Tonga in the French speaking Western province, the term Bamileke
is reserved only for the inhabitants of that part which is francophone. Even
then the term gains its relevance only in the metropolitan areas where para-
doxically no “pan-Bamileke” consciousness has ever developed. What
approximates ethnic consciousness is the individual ethnic group associ-
ation, which brings together people from the same ethnic origin (e.g. Bafou,
Fotouni, Baleng, Bamougoum etc.) without an umbrella association congre-
gating all the groups. If the problem of native/non-native became crystalli-
sed between the Bamileke and the Duala it was because the former ventured
into the politics of controlling the city in which the one-party regime had
carefully struck a balance between native and non-native interests. For
example during the one-party days so-called Bamileke mayors controlled
some district municipal councils (Fampou Dagobert for New Bell) as did
other non-natives from other areas of Cameroon (Tanko Hassan of Norther-
ner origins) and Duala natives. The present crisis arose because democracy
was evidently overturning this balance and protection of interests suppos-
edly in favour of the so-called Bamileke and confirming the near-total marg-
inalisation of the Duala in an area originally theirs.
What also gave impetus to this debate and public restiveness was a
constitutional provision which empowers the state “to ensure the protection
of minorities and [. . .] preserve the rights of indigenous populations” (Law
of 18 January 1996 to revise the constitution of 1972) which goes further
to require that chairmen of the Regional Councils must be indigenes (Article
57/3). The regional structures themselves were introduced as part of solu-
tions to the problem of local peoples in lieu of popular clamours for federal-
ist structures that would have made for local autonomy and initiative. Even
then these have not become reality due to the reluctance of the incumbent
regime which is very protective of centralist structures and fearful of strong
regionalist feelings that it equates with secession. Other provisions of the
constitution require that parties running for pluralistic elections within the
list system take into consideration the sociological composition of the area
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when compiling lists in order to ensure that certain peoples are not under-
represented at the level of decentralised organs of the state (Municipal
Councils, Regional Councils). One reading is that these provisions are
meant to protect people who have come to constitute ethnic minorities in
heterogeneous areas but this would equally raise the critical question of
who is a minority and who can be classified as an indigenous people capable
with claims to rights that have to be protected.
After the first term of office the SDF and other opposition political party
saw a steep decline in the vote in these areas following the twin legislative
and local elections of June 23 2002, a fact that could be attributed to large-
scale disenfranchisement of potential non-native electors. The dream of
the protesters and those arguing in favour of indigenous people’s rights sort
of became true as the majority of the councils in the coastal area were
composed essentially of natives as were the parliamentarians elected during
the twin elections of June 23 2002. The disenfranchisement of non-natives,
which had secured this victory for the local elites, equally served the party
in power, the CPDM as the natives had come to identify themselves in the
majority with it.
In an earlier examination of the same question I had posited that this
situation was the result of the ambivalence with which local peoples lived
a modernization of their living space either as people who have lost total
control of their own destiny or as people who find benefits in this modernisa-
tion (Yenshu Vubo 1998: 34-36). My argument was that the predicament
of the coastal peoples was largely the result of modern peripheral capitalism
operating to dislocate local peoples and thus situating the roots of the pro-
blems in the local history of modernisation. What we are interested in here
is not the problem of causes or origins but the way the modern state structure
has handled this question. This is tantamount to posing the question of
how successive elites have handled the question of plurality and how a
citizenry was being constructed out of the motley of social groups that sud-
denly constituted Cameroon, without making of it a nation (Levine 1964).
Levine, in characteristic western conceptions of plurality within the Third
World context, argued that, although nationalism had support in Cameroon,
the greatest obstacles to its being translated into a factor of integration was
the country’s diversity which expressed itself in a variety of particularisms
(ibid.). He went ahead to argue that such particularisms tended to drown
the concept of national unity/integration when translated into political dem-
ands as these raised a label of conflicting voices. Our own reading of the
situation is different (probably due to the fact that one is writing almost
four decades away): the argument is that the failure of the national unity
project is the result of the inefficacy of policies promoted by successive
political regimes. Ambiguous in nature, they professed a vague formula
of national unity that fluctuated between tough administrative coercion
inherited from the colonial regimes and romantic fraternalism.
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It is in this scheme of things that we are going to analyse the manage-
ment of ethnic diversity as a solution to the predicament of the dislocated
coastal peoples and essentially the political strategies of the Biya regime
style for managing diversity. The argument is that ethnic claims to exclus-
ive rights and protected positions contributed, in an unexpected manner,
to provide a basis of legitimacy for the regime by reconfiguring political
arrangements and serving as a counter force to competing forces either
resulting from social democratic aspirations or ethno-regional discontent.
The semblance of a legitimacy of these is also used by elites as political
capital in the claims for a greater share in government without seeking to
resolve the social crises which is the basis for the claims in the first place.
Local Peoples between Social Crises and Ethnic Claims
One of the issues echoed in the discourses of the protesting elite is the
increasing marginalisation of local peoples that has become the central crisis
of the local coastal peoples since colonial times which generated with it a
social crises of great dimensions. As the area developed from the use of
forced or near forced labour to the voluntary migration of labour in search
of jobs in the English and French mandates, there arose a new problem,
that of the coexistence of the local peoples with immigrants from other
parts of the country, and even beyond. Austen and Derrick (1999: 141)
indicate that Duala ethnic consciousness in relation to other groups devel-
oped in the French Mandate at a period when they had become an “ethnic
minority in their city”. The development of the Duala town into a metro-
politan city brought with it peculiar problems of cohabitation and integration
which expressed themselves in the 1996 protests.
The protests also had an appeal in the Bakweri community which had
had a long and protracted history of an unsolved land crisis. The crisis of
cohabitation between natives and non-natives was evident in the friction
between these two categories of people as early as 1935. It has to be noted
that the concepts of native and stranger as in use today to designate indig-
enes and Cameroonians from other regions respectively have their origins
in colonial discourses and practices: note the use of the term of native stran-
ger to refer to immigrants from other areas of Cameroon (British administra-
tor Bridges quoted by Mbake 1975: 19). As such Fako division is the only
rare place in Cameroon where the concepts of native, stranger, reserve, native
land, stranger quarters still persist in popular imagination and are pregnant
with some meanings that are not obvious to persons alien to the historical
dimensions of this reality. Of recent this category of persons has been
styled come-no-go, a Pidgin English expression for permanent immigrants.
The growth of the Fako area into a cosmopolitan administrative, com-
mercial, agro-industrial growth pole and later on the seat of a university
has not gone to alleviate the crisis. Not only did the population in the
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camps grow and spill over into the local population to create its own army
of job seekers, business operators, craftsmen and farmers among others but
also problems of a different kind and magnitude began to make themselves
felt as formal economic and administrative activities came to concentrate
in the area. The establishment of the national oil refinery, the Société
nationale de raffinage (SONARA), in the neighbourhood of Limbe has transfor-
med the human and physical landscape of Limbe, which the carving into
a Government Residential Area, Bota and New Town had only gone to show
no longer belonging to natives (Courade 1979). The recent resettlement of
natives to give way for the establishment of an industrial shipyard company
generated protests in the tradition of the Bakweri land question. The coloni-
sation of the West Coast, extending from the national refinery company to
Bakingili, by resorts and hotel establishments also goes to emphasise the
rate at which capitalist developments are displacing local and largely weak
local interest groups. Buea, on its part, has also witnessed chaotic growth
since 1970, a situation which puts the government as occupying 54.3% of
the land, with 10.9% being in the hands of the Cameroon Development
Corporation (CDC) and 13.8% held by the University of Buea whose estab-
lishment has also meant an increase in pressure on the land for construction
of dependent services (private student hostels, private business services and
living apartments) (Forba Fru 1999).
Initially, the spate of developments occurring during the colonial era
either in the British or French spheres gave a semblance of meeting the
needs of local peoples who had lost their landed property but who could
replace this with some cultural capital (western schooling) and vantage posi-
tions (employment in subordinate clerical positions in the colonial adminis-
tration)9. Austen and Derrick (1999) have analysed the growth of Duala
elitism at this time but also remarks that it was also the end of an epoch
as the decolonisation movement and the development of a post-colonial state
was going to overtake and have an overbearing influence on the space once
occupied by local peoples. The same is true of the Bakweri but to a lesser
degree. It appears that it was the appointment of prominent elites to serve
9. Witness the illusory celebration of Douala City and Limbe (formerly Victoria)
in the popular mind as centres of civilisation. Douala was literally equated with
Europe itself in the use of the term Douala Mbenge na Sawedi (Douala the West
i.e. Europe of the Sawa people), an expression which became popular with the
hit title of a 1970s record of makossa (pop music) king, Toto Guillaume. Victoria,
later to be renamed Limbe, was perceived for along time to be the centre of
refined life by English speaking people as its colony of resettled peoples (locally
known as krios, a deformation of the word Creole) set the standards of supposedly
high culture for people in the hinterland. The krios also provided the early stock
of the local bourgeoisie when the cooptation of the local people to serve in the
administration of the CDC became an option to circumvent the land crisis. When
the oil refinery was created, the town was pompously referred to as OPEC city.
All these illusory perceptions serve both to legitimate the development of gigantic
modern structures as well as to divert attention from the real issues.
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on the Board and the recruitment of other natives to work in the administra-
tion of the CDC as well as initial domination of the modern civil service
and political life in colonial times by coastal peoples that sent the movement
for redress into relapse. The political developments surrounding the deco-
lonisation of Southern Cameroon fraught with bitterness, rancour and the
manipulation of ethno-regional cleavages further served to divert attention
from the land question and its attendant ills (Ngoh 1996). The preoccupa-
tion with the question of the ethnic origins of political leaders overshadowed
and cast a veil on problems that were real. The policies of the Kamerun
National Democratic Party (KNDP) government dominated by peoples orig-
inating in the Grassfields and largely characterised by partisan victimization
(Mbile n.d.: 174-177) and a propensity to manage the profits of the CDC
than solve the crisis of the structural location of the plantations only con-
firmed the native conception of their problem as that of the “stranger”.
The native thus came to perceive the new stranger had succeeded the
old stranger to continue with the same policies by treating the status quo
as a fait accompli which could not be revisited. It is the political dimension
and not the real objective question of human existence that has resurfaced
with calls for solutions that are only reminiscent of the cosmetic solutions/
palliatives of the colonial period. Just as the Duala had secured a privileged
position in the colonial era (even in a subordinate manner) and the Bakweri
had secured privileged positions in the CDC, they were requesting for a simi-
lar “protection” or privileges as a solution to their predicament in the face
of a current neo-liberal drive characterised by individualism (either in the
vote or in entrepreneurship). At this point it was the communitarian/identity
vision of society represented by Sawa claims against an individualist vision
represented by the neo-liberal modernity of a democracy characterised by
a shift away from the community to the individual (universal suffrage, secret
ballet political party programmes) and unbridled capitalism (liberalisation,
state withdrawal from the social sector, privatisation of public corporations,
rule of the market and the dominant role of transnational financial institu-
tions). Discourses on being pushed into minority status thus serve as the
much needed empirical evidence to boost an essentially political claim.
This leads us to the substance of the question, namely the problem of
the commoditization/alienation of once tribal land, which started in the colo-
nial period but has reached dramatic propositions as this is promoted and
actively championed by local clan/family heads and tribal chiefs. While
the majority of local peoples and the younger elites are clamouring for the
return of once tribal land, the chiefs or clan heads are busy either negotiating
for compensation to be paid to them by the state, continue to sell whatever
land is left or land returned to local communities by the CDC. The case is
reported in the Muea (Lysoka) neighbourhood of a chief of Buea who is
selling out land returned to the community by the CDC. The paramount
chiefs of Buea have also questioned the right of some Bakweri elite in the
USA to constitute themselves into a Bakweri Land Consultative Committee
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(not to be confused with its predecessor of 1946). Moreover, the role of
the chiefs in the privatisation of the plantation (corporation) has been far
from desirable and, at worst, ambiguous. There is a failure on the part of
the chiefs to represent the tribal landed interest to the extent that one would
not be wrong in talking of a crisis of representation. Can the blame there
be attributed to Cameroonians of other regions?
The crisis of overpopulated cosmopolitan areas in the coastal area of
Cameroon also manifests itself in the problem of political participation and
representation, in short, a crisis of democracy. The temporary success of
the Sawa elite in securing exclusive rights to privileged positions would
evidently be at the expense of the popular vote representative of reactions
to deteriorating social conditions and championed by the left-wing SDF in
the pre-1996 period. That the original promoters and leadership of this
party were of Anglophone and Bamileke extraction does not cancel the fact
that the appeal was largely trans-ethnic, cutting across all ethnic groups in
what Konings and Nyamnjoh (2003: 11) refer to as the “south western quad-
rant” in which the Duala or the Sawa are situated. The political vote of
the 1990s right up till 1996 was therefore a protest vote and not a simple
expression of purely ethno-regional discontent. Although Tatah Mentan
(1996: 185) suggests that the Sawa chiefs might have been simply reacting
to press accusations of duplicity, having “lunch with the CPDM in the day
and romance with the opposition in the night [and] organising public demon-
strations against the SDF victory in the Littoral, the Sawa might [have been]
out to prove that they [were] not traitors”. I have a different reading as I
argue else where that this protest is inscribed in a tradition of protest and
claims for a privileged position and exclusive rights in an area which was
once tribal space, these protests starting with the Bonaberi uprisings in the
immediate aftermath of the 1884 annexation treaties and moving through the
opposition to German expropriation plans to Duala petitions against French
urbanisation plans (Yenshu Vubo 1998: 34-36; Kala Lobe 1977; Ngoh 1996;
Austen & Derrick 1999). However this is only one side of the coin as
there is an ambivalent fluctuation between a perception of modernity as
alienating and a perception of modernity as capital (Yenshu Vubo 1998).
We may still emphasize here that the solutions are short-lived and one will
witness a replay of protests or a reversal of attitudes with a reversal of
fortunes. The reactions of the Sawa elite went to underscore their opposi-
tion to a modification of privileges which had been obtained at the expense
of popular interests. The success of these elites in reconverting at least
the “natives” into militants of the incumbent CPDM party, although an insig-
nificant following because of its minority status, and progressively disen-
franchising the “strangers” has not succeeded in solving the crisis. The
situation has moved from one of a crisis of belonging/marginalisation to one
of lack of representation which has been unattended to, a situation which is
very much favourable to the incumbent regime. That is why I liken this
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to political profiteering where the regime is feeding on the ethnic cleavages/
tensions and the social crises resulting from the absence of rational
management.
On the Articulation between Identity and National Politics
An important issue that is central to the question under study is the socio-
cultural or identity dimensions of the crisis and how it has been managed
within the current context. This situation has gone to create or forge what
has come to be known as Sawa awareness. This term was originally used
by the Duala to refer to themselves as seashore dwellers but in the context
of the crisis it has come to be extended to related peoples such as the
Bakweri, Mongo, Pongo, Malimba, the Bakoko and Bassa of Douala city,
Bodiman and Ewudi. Other peoples in the Littoral and South West Provin-
ces were also integrated in the movement viz. Mbo, Bakossi, the Yabassi,
the Balong, Oroko, and Bafaw. Prior to 1996 therefore the term Sawa was
almost inexistent as a term to describe a local regional awareness. Did the
identity awareness motivate the crisis or was it a fall out of the protests?
An awareness of political marginalisation is definitely at the basis of the
protests but in its original form, it does not exist as a pan-Sawa movement.
It is only translated into a regional movement by elites who stress a conver-
gence of interests and thus equate similarity of predicament with similarity
of identity. One cannot doubt that there is a degree of similarity in culture
and language within the region but that did not translate automatically into
a collective awareness. It is the convergence of the crisis of modernisation
that forged this new ethnic identity by building it into a common cultural
heritage symbolised by the ngondo festival. Originally a Duala festival,
the aftermath of the 1996 protests translated it into an assembly uniting
such peoples as were perceived as related to the former, in a process Monga
(2000) terms the “expansion of ethnic frontiers” or the “enlargement of
ethnic frontiers”. It is this invented Sawa identity that transforms a political
movement into a cultural one and uses the cultural to consolidate the basis
for political claims. The Duala elite, who invented this term, as the leading
faction of the coastal peoples, thus attempted to carve an ethnic political
base for themselves which their members could not guarantee in the geopoli-
tics of Cameroon. It is in this sense that Alain Touraine’s (1974: 114)
assertion that dominant classes are the agents of cultural models gains all
its meaning. The concept of invention as used here derives its meaning
from Hobsbawm’s model (1992: 1) which treats such phenomena as includ-
ing both traditions “actually invented, constructed and formally instituted
and those emerging in a less traceable manner within a brief period—a matter
of a few years perhaps-and establishing themselves with great rapidity”.
Austen and Derrick (1999: 184-190) describes the ngondo as a neotradi-
tional creation of the late colonial cum French mandate period. They argue
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that at the period when it emerged, it played a clearly political role “[. . .]
first as a populist organization directed partially against chiefs; then as an
instrument by which the chiefs (and particularly Betote Akwa) represented
Duala interests in the politics of decolonization [. . .]” (ibid.: 184). They
also demonstrate that the balance sheet of this organisation is largely one
of limited success or failure whether one were referring to the politics of
decolonisation or the search for solutions consequent on the situation of
Duala as a capitalist metropolis in the late colonial period viz. commoditiza-
tion/alienation of land, demographic developments which rendered Duala a
“minority [. . .] in their own city” (ibid.: 187). This failure is presented
as transforming the status of the ngondo into that of a ceremonial/ritual
organisation with the role or predominant function of providing a cultural
unity and serving as an identity marker for the Duala (Austen & Derrick
1999: 189-190). One can understand this argument as the scope of the
researchers exclude the late 1990s when the replay of the Duala tradition
of protest against unfavourable modern developments witnessed the re-
emergence of the ngondo as a political instrument. A close observation of
the recent developments surrounding the Sawa protests will bring to the
limelight close parallels in the political role that the ngondo attempted to
play in recent times. In analysing the place of the ngondo in the recent
protest movement one has to bear in the mind that the new ngondo was
re-emerging albeit in a transformed manner and in completely new circum-
stances, from a politically motivated ban10. One also has to note that its
reinvention by the Duala chiefs and elites was taking place in a context of
political effervescence which presented the same predicament (although in
changed circumstances) for the Duala in the face of an invasive modernisa-
tion characterized by the growth of once tribal space into a gigantic metro-
politan area. A striking parallel between the two versions of the ngondo
is the attempt to use it to invent a pan-regional ethnic consciousness and
to carve out an ethnoregional power block out of the contiguous peoples
with cultural similarities with no antecedent in precolonial history. Just as
the Duala strove to expand the definition of their identity to include sur-
rounding peoples with linguistic and cultural similarities in the late mandate
period (Austen & Derrick 1999: 187) so does the ngondo of the 1990s strive
to take on itself a regional character11 and to rally to itself distantly related
peoples affected by the same dislocating modernization. In fact, although
a Duala based protest movement, it later on coopted peoples as territorially
situated between Campo in the South Province and Mamfe in the South
West Province (Tatah Mentan 1996: 187-188) who were not only invited
to the Sawa meetings taking place in the aftermath of the 1996 municipal
10. The ngondo was banned 1981.
11. Witness the change of name from ngond’a Duala (assembly of the Duala) to
ngond’a Sawa (assembly of the Sawa people).
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elections, but were also participants (and later on invitees) to ngondo festiv-
als. It is in this regard that one would argue that the ngondo was a political
instrument and continues to play a political role. This is where we can
talk of a convergence between the cultural and the political and the political
uses into which cultural institutions can be put.
I have shown elsewhere that this Sawa consciousness was based on the
history of the predicament of increasing marginalisation and the “threat of
political alienation” (Yenshu Vubo 2003: 611). It was an identity aware-
ness premised on “a history of dislocation and disintegration under the push
of modernization” (ibid.). I have equally shown that the combined hetero-
geneous nature of the group and “the threat of Duala hegemony through
the Sawa consciousness” led to a decline in the movement itself, a fact
which goes to underline its spontaneous and ephemeral nature. Monga
(2000) on her own part, report that disagreements within projects to enlarge
ethnic political territory also owe much to resistance from more restricted
“local [identities] and conflicting interests” that tend to undermine a pan-
regional consciousness drive.
If the ngondo has failed in its pan-regional bid to serve as rallying point
for a regional consciousness movement in the same manner as the Duala
hegemonic ambitions of the late colonial period, the political gains have
been considerable. The elites in the coastal area have succeeded in clinch-
ing a sizeable share of government positions and in maintaining themselves
in strategic positions out of their support for the regime and in disproportion
to their demographic weight, thereby emerging as an important actor in the
power game. This development modifies power arrangements in Cameroon
considerably, tilting the alliance away from a North-South-Anglophone axis,
wherein the Fulbe, Beti and North Westerners (Western Grassfields) used
to play a key role in the Ahidjo era and part of the Biya mandate, to one
in which the non-Fulbe northerners (Kirdi), Beti and Sawa come to occupy
centre stage and to counter balance so-called an Anglo-Bami block (North
West and Western Provinces), politically on the rise via the SDF, and the
Fulbe, split between cooperation with the regime and a neo-Ahidjoist oppo-
sition. Konings and Nyamnjoh (2000: 6) have argued that by “encouraging
a merger [of the South West Elite Association (SWELA)] with the elite associ-
ation of the native Duala to form the Grand SAWA movement” the Biya
regime sought “to weaken Anglophone solidarity through divide and rule”.
Monga (2000) also argues that the politics of recourse to the village of
origin as electoral base that developed in the wake of protests and calls for
democracy “can be interpreted ultimately as a stratagem aimed at preventing
Bamileke’s alleged political influence from spreading all over the country”.
I would add that the Sawa protests, without being encouraged or created
by the regime per se, successfully also employed same in containing the
rising protest movement among the Anglophone community that could
be observed in the 1990s (Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003: 76-106; Menthong
1996: 151-169).
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One would be right in affirming that the Biya regime used the political
developments resulting from the pressure to democratize as well as the ris-
ing opposition movement of the 1990s, concentrated around the south west-
ern quadrant, to reconfigure the ethnic arithmetic of hegemonic alliances
(Konings & Nyamnjoh 2003: 5) by integrating the Sawa into the system
of ethno regional alliances just as it had used the political developments of
the early periods of his presidency (1982-1984), marked by disputes with
his predecessor and the Fulbe elite, to project and create a rapprochement
with the Kirdi (Non-Muslim Northerners). In fact this would be the first
time since independence that the Sawa have become so prominent in the
political life of Cameroon since E. M. L. Endeley lost power as leader of the
Southern Cameroon internal government in 1958, and when Prince Alexandre
Ndumbe Duala and Soppo Priso fell from prominence as leading Duala in
search of a national political career (Austen & Derrick 1999: 179-184).
One would be right therefore in asserting that the Sawa protests were explo-
ited by local elites and the state alike. In this regard one would not be
far from the truth in affirming that there was a convergence of interests
between the local bourgeoisie and the regime in search of legitimacy. In
the process, the reference to social crises that served as the basis of protest
has become totally eclipsed with the regime’s social posturing being nothing
more than profiteering.
Affirming that the regime did not create this movement means that the
antecedents of Sawa restiveness and protest can be found in history and
that it was not the regime that motivated the Sawa to protest but that the
regime was willing to use same in its quest for political legitimisation.
Our argument is supported by the fact that the power base of the regime
had been considerably eroded in the early 1990s and the ethno regional
drift had sent even the dominant Beti elite of the regime to retreat into its
own region. Faced with a strong opposition in the south western quadrant
emerging as a new political power block that styled itself the Grand West
(in opposition to the Grand North comprising the pre-1983 North Province),
the Beti elite were forced to openly make proposals of a separatist nature
in the same light as other radical movements of the 1990s. Menthong
(1996: 165-166) reports that, during the largely state-controlled constitu-
tional debate that ushered in the revision of January 18, 1996 there were
open calls for the creation of a Beti state, either from a movement calling
itself the Mouvement de Renaissance Pahwine (MOREPAH) or from actors of
the civil society of Beti origins. MOREPAH for instance, proposed a confed-
eral arrangement for Cameroon in which one would find a reworked map
of central Africa to include parts of Cameroon, the Congo, Gabon and Equa-
torial Guinea. Another proposal from the Editor-in-chief of the Courrier
newspaper, with a Beti tribal orientation bordering on factionalism, had pro-
posed the creation of a Beti state corresponding to the Centre, South and
East Provinces of Cameroon. It is our argument therefore that the develop-
ment of the Sawa identity was against the backdrop of varying autonomist
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claims from a variety of groups claiming one form of marginal status or
another, claims unleashed by the clamour for political liberalisation and
that had culminated in the constitutional debate of 1993 (Menthong 1996;
Sindjoun 1996: 98; Konings & Nyamnjoh 2000). Sindjoun (1996: 87) treats
this dynamics as the polarisation of identity conceptualisation along ethno-
regional lines (la polarisation ethno-régionale de l’imaginaire identitaire).
Prior to this period the term Sawa had been used exclusively and only occa-
sionally to refer to the Duala proper. During the debate, elites of the area
later to be called Sawa only referred to themselves as “Forces vives du
littoral” (Menthong 1996: 158). The regional consciousness only developed
gradually at this period until it came to serve the political goals that its
exploitation ushered in.
These developments were sustained by a warped but appealing philos-
ophy of managing ethnic diversity premised on arguments to the effect that:
“Every ethnic group wishes to see its sons and daughters employed so that they
bring something back home. No ethnic group wishes to be absent at the national
dining table where the national cake is shared. Employment in the public service
is a source of pride for those whom ethnicity is a highly sentimental affair. Posi-
tions in the public service are seen as symbols of ethnic power and superiority or
at least equality to other ethnic groups [. . .]. Ethnic groups have a belief [. . .]
that if they are not represented in the process of public policy-making, they will
lose out in the services they receive and development opportunities, programmes
and projects coming to them [. . .]” (Kauzya 2001: 113).
Beyond the oft-quoted metaphor of national cake sharing12, one can pose
the question of the viability of the solution by the promotion of elites. To
the question of how representative any elite are, one can say that they repre-
sent only their interests and elements of local peoples co-opted by the domi-
nant structures rather end up operating according to the laws of the system
than articulating local interests in any democratic way. Neither will they,
in any way, replace a viable social democracy capable of meeting the needs
of local peoples or rehabilitating local peoples in the process of accelerated
disintegration/loss of identity. A co-opted bourgeoisie would often operate
as the internal guarantors of the efficiency of the system, the local relay
that provides the semblance of a universal character of the system by pre-
senting it as trans-ethnic or the local operatives that provide a false sense
of participation.
*
While it has became increasingly evident that it is important to manage the
crisis of diversity that the creation of the nation—state has ushered in, the
12. For more on the cake sharing metaphor see also MONGA (2000).
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solutions so far proposed have been vague. Transcending the unfounded
belief in an ethnic reality’s propensity to divisiveness, a view now largely
discredited (Ake 2000: 92-115), there have been calls for a sane democracy
which respects not only minorities (as the 1996 protesters were calling for)
but diversity. Alain Touraine (1994: 25-30), for instance, posits that the
lessons to be learnt from the tragic events of Bosnia—Herzegovina are the
need to respect liberties and diversity and not only to focus on the concepts
of participation and consensus. He affirms that:
“Ce qui définit la démocratie, ce n’est donc pas seulement un ensemble de garanties
institutionnelles ou le règne de la majorité, mais avant tout le respect de projets
individuels et collectifs qui combinent l’affirmation d’une liberté personnelle avec
le droit de s’identifier à une collectivité sociale, nationale ou religieuse particulière”
(Touraine 1994: 26).
“La démocratie ne réduit pas l’être humain à être seulement un citoyen; elle le
reconnaît comme un individu libre mais qui appartient aussi à des collectivités écono-
miques et culturelles” (ibid.: 30).
A. Touraine (1994: 228) is however cautious when proposing general
solutions to the problem of diversity as he states that it is not sufficient to
state that it is necessary to strike a balance between the diversity of cultures
that make the nation-state and its hegemonic drive towards universal val-
ues. He feels that one has to look for practical ways of how this balance
will be achieved. Institutional guarantees such as constitutional provisions
have been the earliest but most vague solutions that have been proffered
(ibid.: 229).
Recently, diversity issues have become part of the research into public
management. Kauzya (2001: 117) proposes a holistic model whose aim
is “to build a representative civil service that respects the core values of
responsiveness to ethnic diversity, inclusiveness of all ethnic groups in the
country and high quality service delivery”. Balogun (2001: 43) argues in
the same line when he says that “diversity may be perceived as a minimum
condition for the safeguard of the rights and autonomy of groups constitut-
ing a nation-sate”. This is crucial to a lively debate on the future of the
nation-state if it would have to develop into a viable framework for social
existence although the state as it is cannot and has never been the only
framework for social existence. What remains now is how these prescrip-
tions have to become reality. Moreover this is restricted to the domain of
the public service whose propensity to treat the social crises by substituting
viable social policy with elite based strategies that are not apt or suitable
for the management of social questions.
It may be useful examining the implications of the movements such as
the one presented in this study and its outcomes on political life in the
post colonial state in search of a national identity. Firstly, the approach
of apparently legitimising ethno-regional claims, especially when they are
codified in the constitution or when standard bearers of such claims are
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rewarded, constitutes a serious set back to any nation-building project,
thereby “[de-emphasising] the concept of Cameroon both as a geographical
entity and as a nation” (Monga 2000)13. In fact it rids any such project
of its content and only goes to underline the absence of political will on
the part of the supposed architects of such a project. Secondly I have
shown elsewhere that the promotion of such claims brings to the fore the
contradictions between the universalistic claims of states in the South and
the particularism of the claims for the protection of ethnic minorities, a
tension that is at the centre of the nation-building process itself (Yenshu
Vubo 1998: 37). This question raises that of the conceptual limits of the
universal and the particular: can the universal eclipse the particular or vice-
versa? In which domain does the universal apply and in which does the
particular apply? Thirdly, this leads us to the issue of the apparent charm
of arguments in favour of protecting the rights of so-called ethnic minorities
in an extremely pluralistic situation14. It is this apparent charm that
transforms such discourses into ideological tools in the hands of politicians
in an unsuspecting manner. It is therefore important to question the politi-
cal uses into which both state agents and actors of high politics (Chabal
1992) and local peoples intend to put such discourses. Carefully manipu-
lated, the claims for protection may be powerful tools for much needed
autonomy in the hands of local peoples in the search for solutions to con-
crete issues of survival and social progress. Actors of high politics as we
have seen, often resort to such claims in the search for legitimacy and thus
a consolidation of dominant positions.
As Amin (1998: 54) has noted, the collapse of national unity projects
“seems to have given way to ethnicity as a basis for the reward of the
legitimacy of competing forces” in search of a sort of “monopoly mechan-
ism” to borrow from Norbert Elias (in Llobera 1994: 110). It would there-
fore be worthwhile making a distinction both in theory and practice between
the interests of local peoples situated in time and space, with clearly identifi-
able interests of an economic nature (land, access to resources, situation
within the economic system), social/cultural nature (crisis of identity, access
to social services, cohabitation) and political nature (representation), on the
one hand, and the interests of political elite essentially made up of the search
for and preservation of dominant positions, on the other hand. It will enable
one to transcend the conceptual muddle that is at the basis of the tendency
for social crises to serve as a smokescreen behind which ethno regional
13. SINDJOUN (1996: 99), on his part, has remarked that the constitution of Cameroon
institutes a segmented national identity.
14. Recent linguistic surveys show that Cameroon is made up of 276 ethno-linguistic
groups. The Cameroon Linguistic Atlas identifies 286 languages for Cameroon
out of which 279 are living languages, 3 are second languages without mother
tongue speakers and 4 extinct.
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politics operates or the propensity for ethnicity to serve as the veil behind
which social crises lose their value.
University of Buea, Cameroon.
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ABSTRACT
This paper examines how the state of Cameroon has managed ethnic diversity during
the reforms period of the 1990s and early years of the 2000-2010 decade. The
argument is that the period has seen a new type of crisis management in which a
political regime feeds on ethnic tensions and makes political capital out of grievances
of local peoples in the metropolitan areas of the highly urbanized areas of the Littoral
and South West Province. Beyond these developments, the paper argues for a con-
ceptual distinction between the interests of local peoples and communities and those
of elites in search for solutions to the diversity question.
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RÉSUMÉ
Gestion de la diversité ethnique au Cameroun dans un contexte de crises sociales.
— Cet article analyse la manière dont l’État du Cameroun a géré la crise de la diver-
sité ethnique pendant la période des reformes, des années 1990 et du début de la
décennie 2000-2010. Il met en exergue l’argument selon lequel cette période aura
vu l’émergence d’une nouvelle stratégie caractérisée par l’exploitation des tensions
ethniques et des griefs dans certains centres urbains à des fins politiques. Au-delà des
préoccupations conjoncturelles, l’article conclut que, dans la recherche des modes de
gestion de la diversité, il serait nécessaire de faire une distinction conceptuelle, aussi
bien dans la théorie que dans la pratique, entre les intérêts des acteurs des commu-
nautés et ceux des élites.
Keywords/Mots-clés: Cameroon, democracy, diversity, management, minorities, pro-
test, social crises/Cameroun, démocratie, diversité, gestion, minorités, contestation,
crises sociales.
